Managing Contested Issues of Representation in a PhD Dissertation by Hanrahan, Mary U.
 Managing Contested Issues of Representation in a PhD 
Dissertation 
Paper prepared for the Conference of the Australian Association for Research in 
Education, Sydney, December 2000 
 By Mary Hanrahan, with Erica McWilliam                                                                
[Contact email: m.hanrahan@qut.edu.au] 
Faculty of Education, Queensland University of Technology,                                      
Kelvin Grove, Qld. 4059 
Cite as:                                                                                                                
Hanrahan, Mary (2000) Managing Contested Issues of Representation in a PhD 
Dissertation. Australian Association for Research in Education Conference, Sydney. 
Padma, if you're a little uncertain of my reliability, well, a little uncertainty is no bad 
thing. Cocksure men do terrible deeds. Women, too. 
Salman Rushdie, 1982, Midnight's Children, p. 208 
This paper looks at contested issues around representing learning in a PhD dissertation, and 
the controversial structure that resulted, in one particular case. During her PhD Mary 
constructed a partial explanation for unsatisfactory learning in science, using a cross-
disciplinary body of literature (including that relating to critical literacy teaching, second 
language learning, social and cognitive psychology, and sociolinguistics). Taken as a whole, 
the literature seemed to suggest that deep learning and change depend to some extent on the 
nature of interpersonal relationships in the setting, and (tacit) cultural as well as rational 
factors. The dissertation explored the nature of learning and change in two rather different 
contexts, science education and a PhD and proposed that such processes involved a complex 
of interrelated cognitive, social and biological aspects. This proposition had significant 
implications not only for teaching and learning science (Hanrahan, 1998a) and similarly for 
research methodology (Hanrahan, 1998b), it also challenged some of the epistemological 
assumptions and generic conventions underlying expectations about dissertations.  
For my PhD in Education, I was attached to the Centre for Mathematics and Science 
Education, where we often had visiting scholars who challenged the frameworks of 
my thinking and set up unresolved conflicts for me. These in turn led me to other 
Centres in our large Faculty to listen to seminars by other local and visiting 
academics. One of the most challenging of these for me was Erica McWilliam. I could 
accept some of her ideas but was intrigued by others that I did not fully understand or 
could not accept, particularly about the part played by the body in knowledge. I kept 
going back for more and eventually, given that she seemed someone who encouraged 
intellectual debate and was an advocate for research students who were going beyond 
traditional ways of writing theses, I tried out some of my more radical ideas on her 
and risked challenging some of her own. An ongoing dialogue developed out of this 
and I joined her postgraduate student "Posting the Thesis" group. She volunteered to 
be a reader for my dissertation before it went out to examination (and had some say in 
the final format, but not enough to overcome her concerns about some aspects of it). 
Later, after I had graduated, she invited me to present to the group on the topic of 
"Contested Issues in my Thesis". This paper has grown out of that presentation. 
Context 
There are two contexts that are important to the issues raised in this paper. One is the 
intellectual context out of which my dissertation structure evolved, and the other is the 
structure of the dissertation itself. Together they were stimuli for the contestations 
addressed in this paper. 
Intellectual context 
My doctoral research explored the nature of learning and change in two rather 
different contexts, science education and a PhD. Using a cross-disciplinary body of 
literature (including that relating to critical literacy teaching, second language 
learning, social and cognitive psychology, and sociolinguistics) I came to the 
unsurprising conclusion that significant learning and change depend to some extent on 
the nature of interpersonal relationships in the setting, and (tacit) cultural as well as 
rational factors. However, not only does this proposition have significant implications 
for teaching and learning science (Hanrahan, 1998a) and similarly for research 
methodology (Hanrahan, 1998b), but it challenged the way that knowledge should be 
represented, for example, in a PhD dissertation. 
The structure of my PhD dissertation involved several contestations of accepted 
practice. An incident that was to set the scene for this was an exchange with the editor 
of the International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education (QSE) in response to 
an article I had submitted (Hanrahan, Cooper & Burroughs-Lange, 1999). The 
reviewer criticism was that "The meaning of "personal" was too restricted (e.g., to 
planning, thinking and supervisory processes a PhD entails), and boundaries between 
the personal and the academic were drawn too rigidly". This criticism arrived six 
months after I had submitted the paper (that in turn had been rewritten from a 
conference paper prepared more about 10 months previous to that.). I had moved on 
in my thinking about the meaning of the personal and could see the point the editor 
and a reviewer were making. However, when I tried to incorporate this into my paper, 
I found I could not. The paper would have had to change so substantially that it would 
have been a different paper undergirded by a different logic and situated in a different 
context. And yet it was the current paper that had been "accepted for publication 
subject to modifications", and not some other paper that I might now write. I decided 
that we (it was a co-authored paper with my PhD supervisors) needed to stay with the 
logic and language of the current paper, but explain that the reasoning was tied to a 
particular situation, and that with further evolution of the situation, the thinking would 
probably evolve also. My explanation was accepted and the paper was published. 
This was the beginning of my acceptance of the fact that any instance of reasoning, 
such as a particular paper, was tied to a particular debate, that is to a particular 
(historical) context and a particular (historical) discourse community. It was not until 
much later that I saw that this applied more generally to the rest of my PhD. Even by 
this stage in my PhD, I had presented several conference papers and had written a 
draft book chapter, all for different discourse communities. This happened because I 
seemed incapable of being content in a particular paradigm. The more I read, 
researched, and participated in debates that were going on at conferences or in on-line 
communities, the more I found the need to move on from where I had been the 
previous semester. Early in my research it had seemed natural to me to do a quick 
survey study, using multivariate statistics, to test out my developing theory about the 
relationship between student motivation and empowerment factors. However, even 
while writing it up as a paper that was subsequently published, I had to acknowledge 
the extent to which it was a case study tied to a particular perspective and situation. I 
no longer had any desire to claim generalised significance for it, and realised, in fact, 
that it was not very useful in that setting without qualitative data to explain the 
findings. From this interpretive perspective, I wrote my second paper, a qualitative 
report of classroom research. From there, the concerns I had about issues of power in 
research that had emerged in my first paper then led me to critical action research, and 
a book chapter about the tensions involved in using doing action research for a PhD 
study. The QSE paper mentioned above followed after that, as I was becoming 
concerned with other methodological and epistemological issues.  
In the end I had decided that the most I could claim for my learning was that it was a 
particular perspective that had resonance for me given the research I, as Mary 
Hanrahan, had done in a particular cultural and intellectual context. Nevertheless, it 
was more generally accepted that knowledge should be defined as what was accepted 
by a particular academic community. Hence I had to give serious consideration to this 
view of knowledge. If I accepted this latter view, however, it meant that my earlier 
peer-reviewed and published articles, including the survey study, had more academic 
validity than my later, as yet unpublished, writing. The fact that they had lost some of 
their validity for me was a private fact that probably wouldn't interest the discourse 
communities to whom these articles now belonged, even though I myself believed I 
had progressed. In any case, I found that when I reread them they still had validity for 
me within the discourse context. I could accept that they might be somewhat mutually 
incommensurate and yet all valid representations of my learning during my PhD. 
Figure 1. Thesis Structure: The relationship between the dissertation and 
research studies (adapted from thesis, Hanrahan, 1999) 
Yet this raised the question of how such knowledge[s] should be represented in my 
dissertation. My conclusion was that if I was to represent the "contribution to 
knowledge" that resulted from my PhD study, these articles were as least a valid part 
as anything else I subsequently produced. The fact that they belonged to different 
paradigms was mildly troubling but texts like Lemke's (1995) "Textual politics" led 
me to understand that in postmodern times it was acceptable to believe that 
knowledge could be seen in terms of sociocultural practice and that one could − and 
probably did − practice different knowledges concurrently in different discourse 
communities. I or at least someone called Mary Hanrahan, certainly seemed to, as, in 
August, 1999, even though I had moved on to other themes in my completed 
dissertation, two articles by Mary Hanrahan appeared simultaneously: an action 
research report with a critical literacy theme appeared in the Journal of Research in 
Science Teaching, and the QSE paper on personal writing with which I began this 
section. 
PhD Structure 
As depicted in Figure 1, my dissertation contained many separate studies. The dark 
ball on the left represents the boundaries of my thesis as I saw it in the early stages of 
my PhD, while the other less complete shapes represent later studies, some of them 
having little in common with either the original project or each other. The large oval 
shape represents what I eventually presented in my dissertation. In general the 
different studies are set in somewhat incommensurable discourses, not normally 
allowed within a single dissertation. 
The other point that needs to be made about the dissertation is that it has two levels at 
which I present my themes:  
On one level I am concerned with learning in secondary school science, which the 
science education literature has shown to be problematic in some areas, while at the 
second level, I am concerned with my own learning, which leads me to search for a 
methodology consistent with my developing theory about learning and change. (From 
thesis abstract, Hanrahan, 1999, p. I.) 
Table 1: Dissertation structure 
Chap Chapter heading Chapter Function 
1 A postmodern narrative of research in 
science education 
Introduction:  
Introduces themes, methodology and 
structure 
2 The terraces of awareness Biographical:  
Charts epistemological changes over 
course of PhD 
3 Exploring the boundaries of science 
education (papers included) 
Case studies reported: 
Sets published case studies (5) in 
narrative of research journey 
4 Emerging science education issues Meta-analysis of 5 case studies: 
Theorises science education findings and 
reports conclusions and applications and 
implications 
5 Reworking memory Academic biography: 
Sociological narrative explaining 
development of particular 
epistemological perspective 
6 An ugly duckling methodology 
discovers swans 
Methodology: literature review 
Review of the literature to find a 
research paradigm compatible with my 
research methods and epistemological 
beliefs 
7 Reflexive eco-biosocial system 
appraisal 
Methodology: research methods 
Analysis of the somewhat intuitive 
methods involved in the meta-
methodology 
8 Debriefing [Anti-]Conclusion 
An exploration of several ways to end 
the dissertation 
In terms of dissertation content (see Table 1), all the usual parts were there: literature 
reviewing, sections about methodology, sections about findings, discussion of 
findings and conclusions, but in this case they were fragmented, not in the expected 
order and often paradigmatically inconsistent with each other, since I presented the 
science education studies as the articles written at different stages of the evolution of 
my epistemological beliefs. The design and methodology weren't recognised as such 
until the very end and were in fact findings from a meta-analysis of the whole process. 
Because this was relevant to my finding about methodology, I refused to pretend that 
they had been consciously planned just to satisfy expectations of elegant simplicity. 
The literature was scattered throughout, in some cases appearing for the first time in 
the inserted journal articles. On top of this, I had two unexpectedly personal chapters, 
both somewhat biographical, one a narrative of the epistemological changes I 
underwent and one a narrative of the life events that I believed led me to the themes 
and even the findings of my PhD research. 
You may begin to see why Erica, as an interested colleague and reader, had serious 
concerns about the reception my dissertation was likely to have from examiners. 
However, I believed deeply in the necessity for me of doing what I was doing and 
insisted on going ahead and having it sent out. I hope this paper will show both why 
Erica had concerns and why I believe I was justified in what I did. 
Some Contested Issues  
Table 2 lists some contestations of aspects of my PhD dissertation and categorises 
them under three headings: epistemological, linguistic, and methodological. The 
epistemological thematics centre around the extent to which authority resides in the 
author or the reader, personal agency is a reality or myth, learning is biological or 
sociocultural, and the extent to which knowledge should be represented as multi-
paradigmatic or mono-paradigmatic. The linguistic thematics recast some of the same 
issues in terms of discussion of what is allowable within the dissertation genre and 
whether the genre can be changed as our view of knowledge changes. Finally, the one 
methodological thematic addressed is the question of the legitimacy of explicitly  
Table 2. Contested Issues of Representation in the PhD Dissertation 
Epistemological issues 
Author decides meaning 
Personal as agency 
Learning as biological 
Knowledge as multi-
paradigmatic 
Linguistic issues 
Discourse discontinuity 
Knowledge as practice 
Including personal information 
Style & register discontinuity 
Methodological issues  
Reporting intuitive & tacit as 
part of method 
< ------------------- > 
< ------------------- > 
< ------------------- > 
< ------------------- > 
< ------------------- > 
< ------------------- > 
< ------------------- > 
< ------------------- > 
< ------------------- > 
  
Reader decides meaning 
Personal as performance 
Learning as socio-cultural 
Knowledge as uni-
paradigmatic 
Discourse continuity  
Knowledge as a logical 
process 
Writing only impersonally 
Style & register continuity 
Reporting use of systematic 
methods only 
reporting non-systematic methods, in particular the use of intuition and tacit learning, 
as part of research methodology. In practice this tripartite division is difficult to 
maintain, since, in a way, the problem is not whether or not the epistemological issues 
are valid ones but how they should be [re]presented in my dissertation-ultimately a 
linguistic question of what is allowable in this particular genre. 
Epistemological issues 
"There must be death of the author" 
This issue can be summed up as a conflict between my tendency to try to help the 
reader make sense of my writing, and the dictum that it is the reader alone who can 
say what the text means. Barthes (1977) insisted that the author is "dead" from the 
moment that he or she has written their piece. "[T]he birth of the reader must be at the 
cost of the death of the Author" (p. 148). The question is about the meaning inherent 
in the cultural artefact, and who has the right to decode it. Barthes seems to me to be 
implying that the author cannot know what the writing means while the reader can. 
Hence a commentary on how to read the dissertation is out of the question, a vain and 
misguided attempt to change the (natural?) course of history.  
One could comment, however, that this seems to presume a sophisticated readership, 
a group thoroughly familiar with "the" culture in which the text is set, a view that 
seems somewhat discordant with the plurality of the postmodern times, wherein there 
is no knowing where a text may end up and by whom and how it may be read. 
Moreover, it seems to presume an Ideal Reader possessing the accumulated wisdom 
of the entire culture. I should mention that Barthes (1977) acknowledges that reading 
may be culturally specific in special cases. With regard to narrative he writes that the 
enjoyment of a narrative may be "shared by men [sic] with different, even opposing, 
cultural backgrounds" (with their being some suggestion of a meaning that transcends 
time and place). However, he comments in a footnote that "It must be remembered 
that this is not the case with either poetry or the essay, both of which are dependent on 
the cultural level of their consumer." (p. 79) 
If we reject a monocultural view, the author has the responsibility of guiding the 
reader through unfamiliar territory. From a social semiotic viewpoint (e.g., Christie, 
1993), it has been argued that reading is a cultural art that needs to be learnt (and 
taught). A child who is unfamiliar with fairy tales will not appreciate the details and 
nuances of a new tale. Similarly some of us may be highly uncomfortable in a hyper 
textual environment where the order in which the text is to be read is not a given and 
we ignore the vital information contained in the graphics.  
If one acknowledges that meaning is not absolute, but rather contextually or culturally 
bound, one must allow an author to recognise that a reader used to an alternative 
tradition may need to be put in the picture when an unfamiliar textual genre is being 
used. Note that in the same book in which the "The Death of the Author" article 
appears (Barthes, 1977), when Barthes himself performs a textual analysis of a piece 
of narrative, he includes an introduction that he calls "clarifications - or precautionary 
remarks", in which he explains not so much what kind of a analysis this is to be, as 
what kind of analysis it won't be. He sets his analysis in the context of recent 
developments in semiology and an appreciation of changes in understanding of what a 
"text" may be. 
This is particularly relevant to my own situation with respect to my PhD dissertation, 
where I believed that some explanation for the unexpected was called for. As 
explained in the introduction, my PhD dissertation was not by any means a traditional 
one, nor was it stylistically similar to more recent ones. I had decided to write in a 
way that reflected the beliefs that had evolved during the course of my PhD research. 
I could not accept that is was logical to present work in a way that was inconsistent 
with the epistemological beliefs underlying the theory and practice being reported. 
However, I was to discover that many did not agree with me; regardless of one's 
epistemological beliefs, a particular dissertation genre was assumed as appropriate.  
Because of its unusual nature, when I wrote my dissertation, I thought that my 
intentions could, or even, would be misinterpreted by readers who assumed that a 
dissertation would obey, if not written, then at least, unwritten rules. I thought that 
readers might simply put my divergence from expectations down to ignorance and 
send the document back for writing according to the appropriate conventions. 
Consequently I wrote a "Preamble" to explain that I understood the conventions but 
had to change them where they were in conflict with my epistemological beliefs. I 
appreciated the fact that there were conventions about how PhD was usually written 
up, but wanted to argue that genres need to evolve when they could no longer achieve 
the purposes they had evolved to achieve. 
There were two reactions to this move, as an extract from a letter I wrote back to one 
of my examiners shows:  
At an earlier stage of the thesis I wrote a preamble ... However, I discarded it partly 
because of someone like you who argued that the writer should not try to influence 
the reader directly, but more because I noticed that it had little impact on those who 
were not familiar with the kind of sociolinguistic argument I was putting forward-they 
simply missed the point, from my perspective, which illustrated well the limited 
power of logical argument when assumptions are not shared)." [From letter to 1st 
examiner after I had been awarded the PhD.] 
I gave up the Preamble but, given the genre problem, still persisted throughout the 
dissertation in explaining to the reader the logic of the structure and stylistic 
variations. In retrospect I may have done better to have kept a Barthien preamble and 
trusted the reader to come with me in the body of the dissertation. 
The personal as agency <------------------- > The personal as performance 
Quite apart from the issue of how (or how much) the personal should be allowed in 
academic writing (which I deal with in the following section dealing with genre 
issues), the way I referred to the personal in my dissertation caused some problems 
for postmodern readers who seemed to assume that it was no longer legitimate for 
anyone to assert that the individual was in any way an agent in the production of her 
or his knowledge or practice. Although I could acknowledge how much our social 
practice, including our thoughts, owes to the influence our sociocultural environment, 
I still find the concept of "mind" a meaningful one, even though I would include the 
whole body as part of the workings of the mind, and I will explain that further under 
the sub-heading referring to the biological nature of learning and human 
understanding. I consider that the human organism has a particular kind of nature, due 
to the peculiarities of its structure and functioning, including the brain and nervous 
system, and the body's biochemistry and physiology. I also believe that this differs 
between individuals, both genotypically and phenotypically, and that it is important to 
note that thinking and learning are to some extent an [active] interaction between the 
body-mind and its environment and not the passive one-way imprinting that the 
sociocultural perspective often seems to suggest. 
I am interested in both sociocultural and biological influences on the body-mind, but 
more significantly, I am interested in the interaction between the two. Being interested 
in learning and change, I want to challenge the status quo and get people (including 
myself) to critique our practice, that is to critique what happens at sub-conscious as 
well as conscious levels. This is similar to the kind of project that post-structuralists 
have in mind. However, I am also interested in how the body works when in its use of 
consciousness, and in processing its perceptions, including internal ones such as 
feelings and memory. The notion of a body-mind interacting with its milieu is crucial 
to my purposes. For me individual and social practice is much more than a 
performance. Because we are human beings we are continually interacting with the 
environment, with our own current performances, and also with our internal states 
such as feelings and memories. When any of these types of interactions is missing, we 
are likely to be rated as being dysfunctional in some way or as suffering from an 
illness. 
I suspect that the negative response of some intellectuals to a stance such as mine is 
an aesthetic one: the body as a live organism is too lowly to come into intellectual 
conversations, and it is distasteful to admit that the body might influence our thinking. 
The body that is often talked about is a purely sociocultural body-mind, with no real 
feelings, no biochemistry or physiology impacting on it. Barthes (1977) himself 
looked up to the poet Mallarmé who, writing in an age that was reacting to both 
romanticism and realism, yearned to get beyond the baseness of reality to Higher 
Meaning. For Barthes, not only did he want to claim that the concept of persons was 
misleading, but the very thought of activity at the individual level was repugnant. He 
seemed to particularly decry any association between meaning and bodies. Writing is 
good, but the voice somehow "smells". Theatre was only bearable when it consisted 
of puppets operated by dead-pan or head-covered operators, with the words coming 
from separate equally dead-pan declaimers, so that only purely symbolic meaning 
could emerge; he expressed an extreme dislike bordering on disgust at live actors 
expressing emotions that emerged from bodies. 
My reaction to this aesthetic response to my position is that I like the way that the 
body interacts with the mind to produce a thinking, perceiving, and feeling person. 
After half a lifetime of asceticism and self-denial in the supposed cause of the some 
higher meaning, I have just made friends with my body, my emotions and my mind, 
and am not about to accept an invitation to regress, as I see it, especially when it 
seems to me to be expressed as dogmatically as was the Catholic catechism of my 
childhood. 
Learning as biological <------------------- > Learning as socio-cultural 
My initial background was in English and French literature, and Education, but more 
recently I have studied biochemistry, physiology and psychology, and these studies 
have convinced me that what goes on in the mind is very much tied up with the body, 
reciprocally. What I know generally of physiology and biochemistry, and more 
particularly of neuro-anatomy and physiology leads me to assume that a human being 
has particular ways of perceiving and understanding (cf. Maturana & Varela, 1992; 
Damasio, 1994). Part of the human way of understanding, I believe, is to make a 
coordinated response to the sensations, feelings and thoughts available at any one 
time, by creating a synthesis that allows a coordinated response to be made. 
Consciousness is not just an epiphenomena as the behaviourists suggested. It is an 
integral part of the way the body integrates its perceptions of both internal and 
external sensations, thoughts and feelings, and present and past experience, in order to 
coordinate a single response or a set of responses to a situation.  
I believe that the healthy body needs to have this sense of a unified organism, a 
continuing sense of self, to be able to interact successfully with its environment. 
Having a sense of oneself as an individual organism separate from other organisms, 
with some responsibility for one's own survival, is part of the way human beings− and 
perhaps other animals− naturally are, have always been, and have to be, if they are to 
adapt to their environments. This in itself does not preclude having multiple social 
identities. However, the fact that memory is one of the input sources of the thoughts 
and feelings available means that a cumulative identity tends to develop and influence 
any behaviour. One is not simply a body with multiple performances, each mutually 
independent of the other. The fact that there is a tendency of the brain to create 
theories that allow one to predict and therefore to have the possibility to have some 
control over one's existence, means that subconsciously one is always looking for 
ways of generalising what is happening, both inside and outside of one's head. Like 
Kelly (1955), I believe there is evidence that one of the tendencies of human beings is 
to build constructs based on generalisation about their experience, including their 
experience of themselves. Further I believe there is a tendency to resolve 
inconsistencies by whatever means available, whether by ranking, reaching a 
compromise, giving primacy to one set of inputs whether that be "gut feeling", logical 
deductions, Taro cards or tea leaves.  
This does not necessarily lead to rampant competitiveness or extreme forms of 
individualism or capitalism (cf. Barthes, 1977; Lemke, 1995); on the contrary, it may 
be most adaptive for individuals to form collectives as happens in other parts of the 
animal kingdom. Having a sense of oneself as an individual or a person does not 
preclude having a sense of oneself as part of a larger body such as a community, and 
vice versa. In either case having a sense of some control over and responsibility for 
one's destiny and the destiny of the group is necessary for the individual or the group 
to survive and prosper. 
Knowledge as multi-paradigmatic <------------------- > Knowledge as uni-
paradigmatic 
The final epistemological contestation relating to my dissertation that I want to 
mention is in regard to the question of the unity of knowledge. Even though I think 
we are persons whose consciousness is more or less continuous, I accept that 
knowledge of all kinds is practice, and that practice can be different in different social 
settings (cf. Lemke, 1995), and necessarily is when each setting has its own discourse. 
Thus a person can operate using several different discourses contemporaneously, with 
this being the norm, rather than the exception, especially in complex communities. In 
academic research, this can mean "practising" in several paradigms according to the 
academic communities to which one belongs, with each having its own values, its 
preferred research questions, its accepted research methods and its own debates.  
I began to question the appropriateness of the written and unwritten rules for writing a 
dissertation, given these new beliefs about how knowledge develops and how one 
person's knowledge can cut across several discourse systems. I believed that my 
position on the above epistemological issues had several implications for how I 
should represent the knowledge I had gained during my PhD. The following section 
explores several contestations around my dissertation related to the traditional 
dissertation genre. 
 
Linguistic/Genre Issues 
I believe that genres should change once they become too inconsistent with the 
purposes they were originally developed to serve. In the Preamble I explained my 
challenges to the traditional generic format using terms and relationships derived from 
Halliday's (1994) systemic functional grammar, that implied that genres could and 
should adapt as purposes change. This is part of a systemic linguistic theory `which 
holds that language is a resource people use for the construction and negotiation of 
meaning' (Christie & Rothery, 1989, p. 3.). Christie & Rothery (1989) explained that 
"genres have evolved in such a way that they `introduce a kind of stability into a 
culture at the same time as being flexible enough to participate in social change" 
(Martin, Christie and Rothery, 1987, cited in Christie & Rothery, 1989). Christie and 
Rothery emphasised the purposive nature of genres, writing that "genres have evolved 
as part of the process by which participants in the culture have developed ways of 
`getting things done' - that is, ways or [sic] pursuing and achieving important goals of 
various kinds" (p. 6). Hence they allowed that genres could change as society 
changed, but commented that they believed that genres tended to be invisible because 
"a strong ideology operate[d]" to keep them that way, partly so that they would 
remain unexplored and unchallenged. 
I pointed out that the expected dissertation structure and format served purposes that 
were more modern that postmodern, with knowledge being seen as unified, 
abstractable from context, impersonal, continuous and essentially logical. I argued 
that this should change when it was inconsistent with the epistemological beliefs 
underlying the production of knowledge, which I believed was the case for me.  
Discourse discontinuity <------------------- > Discourse continuity  
If knowledge is seen as practice, and practice is seen as something that belongs to a 
particular discourse community, then it is not only possible but also likely that a 
[postmodern] person's knowledge will be somewhat discontinuous as she moves 
between different contexts. A representation or performance of knowledge that is 
consistent with such beliefs, whether it be literary or academic writing should reflect 
this discontinuity. However, this did not seem allowable in a dissertation, where a 
consistent performance within a single paradigm was expected, and where knowledge 
was expected to be should be consistent over time and context. 
While I found paradigmatic consistency easy enough to maintain for short periods of 
time, when I was completing a single, bounded study and writing a single research 
paper, I found it impossible to maintain over several years, when I found myself 
moving from one paradigm to another. Initially I concluded that with each change, I 
was back to the square one with my PhD. However, partly because I had papers 
accepted for publication at each stage, I gradually came to the conclusion that the 
knowledge I had gained overall was at least as much as I would have gained if I had 
stayed with any particular study and paradigm, and possibly more, and that what I had 
learned from the earlier studies eventually led to the insights that appeared to result 
from the final completed study. The direction of influence was also reversed as my 
final study influenced my rewriting of earlier papers for publication. This was despite 
the fact that these studies were somewhat incommensurate.  
Rather than rejecting what seemed to me to be a valid outcome from my research, I 
gave up the notion of presenting the research under the umbrella of a single paradigm 
and decided to include all the studies to illustrate how learning could happen in the 
same person in several paradigms, somewhat simultaneously. I wanted to suggest that 
knowledge was more a social practice than the objective logical process that the 
mono-paradigmatic stance suggests.  
Knowledge as practice <------------------- > Knowledge as a logical process 
This brings me to my second reason for wanting to challenge the kinds of unities 
expected in a dissertation. Not only was epistemological unity expected but one was 
expected to perform one's knowledge as a logical argument, and preferably a tight, 
elegant, logical argument, regardless of one's epistemology. This implied that 
knowledge was gained through straight-forward logical processes akin to the mythical 
scientific method, with which even scientists cannot identify, according to Medawar 
(1969), a Nobel-winning biologist. I believed (and argued in my dissertation) that, not 
only was learning a matter of social practice, but it was also a matter of personal 
practice. I contended that my deepest insights came, not from systematically 
following a logical process from beginning to end, but from personal processes that 
could be partly subconscious and in which values, feelings and emotions were crucial 
ingredients. Nevertheless, I did preserve at least a narrative logic as I did a meta-
analysis of the five disparate science education papers that were included as artefacts 
in a single chapter and followed this with an analytic chapter in which I looked at the 
implications and applications of my findings. Later chapters on the meta-methodology 
took these logical implications and applications to another plane. Thus I did preserve 
some logical unity over several chapters of the dissertation.  
Other chapters, however, such as the autobiographical chapters, did not attempt to 
make more than symbolic links to this logical thread. This was because I wanted to 
demonstrate that, not only was knowledge a social production that was not necessary 
the result of purely logical processes, but that it was also a personal production. 
Demonstrating this in my dissertation involved questioning another of the conventions 
of the dissertation genre as generally understood, and I address this in the next 
section. 
The place of the personal in a dissertation 
I included personal, occasionally very personal, information when, traditionally, a 
dissertation was meant to be a purely intellectual argument. I did this initially because 
I believed that the most I could present in my dissertation was ultimately my 
particular perspective of my research, an interpretive account, and that this could be 
best understood in relation to a particular personal context. I needed to provide the 
kind of data about myself that would help the reader judge the validity of my 
interpretation. 
Objections to this would include the traditional one that subjectivity was suspect but 
in a research context where objectivity was becoming a problematic word this was not 
the major objection. More powerful was an objection that such data were irrelevant 
and there should be as little of it as possible. My response to this was to stress the fact 
that I only included personal data that was relevant to the sociocultural context or else 
to my arguments about methodology and epistemology, both directly and by using 
headings that would signpost this. Including personal details was a necessary part of 
demonstrating both my methods of arriving at new knowledge and the epistemology 
underlying these methods. 
Yet another objection that was to do with relevance was the objection that a subjective 
account could affect the reader at an emotional level, that, in fact, I was appealing to 
the reader to feel sorry for me when I recounted what the reader saw as misfortunes. 
There was a little of that at one moment when I was feeling neglected and rather bitter 
that my appendices would probably not be read. On hearing this criticism, I 
immediately recognised it and removed any part in which there as a clear appeal for 
sympathy. If there remained parts that unduly roused pity in the reader, I was unaware 
of them. In fact, I wrote the main autobiographical chapter in the third person, and this 
made me feel as though I was writing about another person and I felt quite distanced 
from the Former Me that I was writing about. I had also included diary extracts 
intended to demonstrate my methodology and among them were some rather personal 
poems to illustrate the part that relationships and emotions played in my intellectual 
thought processes. Again, I felt distanced from these objectified examples. However, 
because others seemed not to be able to see beyond what they saw as intimate self-
disclosure to appreciate their methodological relevance, I removed any in which 
intimate emotions were expressed. 
I suspect now, however, that the major obstacle to accepting the personal in 
postmodern writing was none of these, but rather, as already suggested above, had to 
do with specific aesthetic values in the postmodern academic world that I was drifting 
into. There, objections to the personal and the particular had at least some of their 
roots in modern French writing such as that of Barthes, that is turn had roots in French 
symbolism and idealism where everyday reality was seen as ignoble. Meaning was 
sought at a symbolic level above the level of individuals and there was a general 
rejection of the notion of the "human person" and the idea that anything was 
meaningful at the individual level.  
This created a particular difficulty for me at this particular time, because my own 
movement was in a contrary direction, as I mentioned above. I had been newly 
converted to a version of social constructivism that preserved an individualist 
emphasis. Before that, I had been inspired by biological and psychological sciences 
that suggested that a person's biochemistry as well as physiology played an active part 
in thought processes. More recently, I had discovered that my own thinking was 
particularly dependent on my personal history and physiological responses. 
Consequently, I could not respond positively to being asked to accept that persons did 
not exist, minds did not exist, psychology was based on a fallacy, meaning only 
existed "out there" in the culture, and was not apprehended by minds but rather by 
writers, now depersonalised as "instances" (Barthes, 1977) writing (or these days 
tapping away at their keyboards), unconsciously transmitting− hopefully in pure form 
(unsullied by personal intervention)− what their bodies picked up and responded to 
from the culture, to be read in turn by other instances that would apprehend it again 
with little interference from a conscious "mind". This school of thought seemed to 
include support for a belief that an interest in persons and the personal was 
intrinsically evil, and part of a movement that had been responsible, according to 
Barthes (1977) for a "positivism, the epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology" 
(p. 143; see also Lemke, 1995), and as such, it was suggested that modern writers 
would not entertain it for a moment. Nor, would it seem, should postmodern writers, 
my respondents suggested. I disagreed. 
 
Style and register discontinuity <------------------- > Style and register continuity 
I saw my major role as author of my dissertation as one of communicating my 
principal findings to my readers. I had already decided that personal factors such as 
feelings were an important part of the way humans learnt, and I had learnt to doubt 
the efficacy of logical argument alone as a way of bringing about substantial changes 
in human understanding. Consequently, I saw it as inconsistent to then attempt to 
communicate only by using logical argument, but rather believed that I had to use 
artistic as well as logical processes to communicate my learning in my dissertation.  
My principal method was to use narrative, as I see narrative as a way of connecting 
with and challenging readers' personal beliefs and values, which I see as crucial to 
learning and change. However, in line with my challenge to discourse continuity, and 
a view of knowledge as a discontinuous set of practices, I used a variety of narrative 
approaches and juxtaposed them in the hope that between them they would find some 
resonance in the reader or manage to shock the reader into taking a new perspective. 
Chapter 2 was an analytic first person narrative account of the epistemological 
journey I undertook during my PhD, with the style of writing changing during the 
chapter to reflect the increasing complexity of my thinking. Chapter 5 went back 
much further and showed how my findings in my dissertation had their connections 
with both implicit and explicit beliefs and values that could be traced back to earlier 
stages in my life, including my childhood. However, this time it was more of a 
sociological account, written in the third person and showing how the sociocultural 
context and life experiences of the author had influenced her beliefs and practice. The 
final chapter, Chapter 8, is an account of an imaginary interview between the author 
and a mentor, as the author struggles to decide how such a dissertation, should 
conclude, given that a purely logical conclusion would seem inconsistent with its 
themes. 
I believed that knowledge is a somewhat fragmented, even messy process, crossing 
several discourses, that it is a personal and social as well as a logical process, and has 
both sociological and biological roots, to be reflected in the dissertation, both by the 
arrangement of the chapters, and by variations in the style and register of writing. 
Methodological issues  
Reporting intuitive and tacit as part of method <------------------- > Reporting 
systematic methods only 
While I found that impersonal and systematic logical processes were useful for 
justifying thinking that did not move beyond my status quo, they were not sufficient 
for taking me beyond that. One of the findings from my research into my own implicit 
methodology was that both my learning blocks and my learning break-throughs were 
intimately tied up with what went on in my body, might only be traceable through my 
feelings and emotions, and were often understandable only in relation to my personal 
history. This in turn had resulted from my theories about learning that resulted from 
my research in science classrooms. 
Hence, my autobiographical chapter, that had begun as context setting for an 
interpretive study, by the end had become crucial to my arguments about learning and 
about methodology:  
1. I was showing how my epistemological beliefs evolved, as often as not, from 
prior life experiences unless these were intimately connected up to personal 
meaning making.  
2. I wanted to show that the learning that could easily be interpreted as being the 
result of largely conscious logical processes (e.g., from a review of the 
literature, or from following an argument), could just as forcefully be seen as 
the result of an interaction between my particular physical body and my 
sociocultural milieu 
It was very important to me to make the tacit part of learning, the effect of feelings, 
emotions, and intuitions, visible, to support my argument that learning is personal as 
well as social and logical, to attempt to counteract the myth that learning is largely an 
impersonal logical process. Hence, although I had reported using various 
methodologies in the different studies− multivariate statistical analysis, ethnography, 
action research, narrative inquiry, linguistic analysis− I felt compelled to analyse the 
implicit methods that helped me achieve new insights as I subconsciously processed 
the findings using more systematic methods. The systematic logical methods did help 
me reach new insights, but only when combined with unstructured ones that allowed 
me to tap into what was going on at less conscious levels, especially by tuning into 
my emotions. Consequently, I included two methodological chapters among the 
findings of my dissertation, one analysing my meta-methodology to discover my 
implicit methods (cf. Hanrahan, 1998a) and the other analysing this process 
theoretically, in terms of a range of theories including cognitive science, 
organisational change theory, critical theory, and ecological system theories, whether 
socially or biologically-based (cf. Hanrahan, 1998b).  
Conclusion 
This paper has explored the implications for the dissertation genre of certain beliefs 
about learning and knowledge in postmodern times. It looked at contested issues 
around representing learning in a PhD dissertation, focusing on the controversial 
structure that resulted from such beliefs in one particular case. The thematics of this 
discussion included epistemological issues, issues related to genre, and 
methodological issues. 
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